




Abstract—As privacy becomes a major concern for consumers 
and enterprises, many research have been focused on the privacy 
protecting technology in recent years. In this paper, we present a 
comprehensive approach for usage access control based on the notion 
purpose. In our model, purpose information associated with a given 
data element specifies the intended use of the subjects and objects in 
the usage access control model.  A key feature of our model is that it 
allows when an access is required, the access purpose is checked 
against the intended purposes for the data item. We propose an 
approach to represent purpose information to support access control 
based on purpose information. Our proposed solution relies on usage 
access control (UAC) models as well as the components which based 
on the notions of the purpose information used in subjects and 
objects. Finally, comparisons with related works are analyzed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
HE rapid growth in information technology and database 
systems has greatly increased the need for privacy 
protection. Privacy becomes a major concern for consumers 
and enterprises, much research have been focused on 
developing the privacy protecting technology. Access control 
has been considered as a major issue in information security 
community since the beginning of the information security 
discipline. A number of privacy protecting access control 
models have been proposed in recent years [1]. Through 
access control, the system can restrict unauthorized users 
access to the resources in the system and guarantees the 
confidentiality and integrity of the resources. Traditional 
access control models primarily consider static authorization 
decisions based on the subjects' permissions on target objects. 
It focuses on the protection of data in a closed environment. 
More recently research in authorization is about trust 
management [20].  Trust management relates authorization to 
a user's capability and properties. These access models have 
been used on the control 
of access to server-side objects. Digital rights management  
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(DRM) is used for objects disseminated [14]. Current DRM 
solutions are largely focused on payment-based dissemination 
controls.  Because each of access control, the authorization 
decisions are generated at request time but do not consider 
ongoing controls for long access or for revocation. We need a 
comprehensive, systematic approach for controls on usage of 
digital objects. Recently proposed usage control is a new 
access control model extending traditional access control 
models in multiple aspects [9]. The term “usage” means usage 
of rights on digital objects. The main different properties of 
usage control with traditional access control models are 
continuity of access decision and mutability of subject 
attributes and object attributes [9].  Continuity is another 
decision factor in access control management. In traditional 
access control, authorization is assumed to be done before 
access is allowed (pre). However, it is quite reasonable to 
extend this for continuous enforcement by evaluating usage 
requirements throughout usages (ongoing).   
     In order to protect data privacy, the notion of purpose plays 
a major role in access control models and an appropriate 
metadata model was developed to support such privacy based 
access control models [6].  Purpose is the reasons to collect or  
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to access private data in access management systems. The 
important techniques for private information happen within 
database management systems (DBMS) specifically tailored to 
support privacy policies, such as the well know P3P standard 
(W3C). In particular, Agrawal et al. [1] recently introduced 
the concept of Hippocratic databases, incorporating privacy 
protection in relational database systems. An important feature 
of their work is that it uses some privacy metadata, consisting 
of privacy policies and privacy authorizations stored in 
privacy-policies tables and privacy-authorizations tables 
respectively. However, they neither discussed the 
sophisticated concepts of purpose with hierarchy structure, 
nor the prohibition of purpose and association of purposes and 
a data element. 
Our previous work has, however, some limitations [15]. 
The first is that it has been developed based on XML and 
object-relational data model with using usage access control. 
But to manage purpose information that are complex, have 
hierarchical structures and are characterized by several 
semantic relationships, we need to develop  a  sophisticated 
purpose management model. The second is that does not 
adequately address the problem of how to determine the 
purpose for which certain data are accessed by a given user. 
We believe that this issue may be satisfactorily addressed by 
relying on the usage access control model. However, in order 
to support specifying for which purpose a certain can be 
accessed by a given object, we need to develop an extend 
usage model which is based on the purpose of subjects and 
objects. Such an extended UAC model has never been studied 
before and, the new model and its authorizations are the major 
contributions of this paper.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 provides a brief overview of purpose and access purpose 
determination. The usage control model and Continuity 
properties are introduced in this section. Section 3 shows our 
proposed authorization models for usage control using 
purpose scheme. It includes pre-Authorizations, ongoing-
Authorizations, pre-Obligations, ongoing-Obligations, pre-
Conditions and  ongoing-Conditions six models. Section 4 
presents usage access control architectures based on purpose 
data. Section 5 reviews the differences between the work in 
this paper and others related works. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED TECHNOLOGIES 
A. Purpose 
A privacy policy mainly concerns with which data object is 
used for which purposes. As the purpose directly dictates how 
accesses to data items should be controlled, therefore, purpose 
plays a central concept in many privacy protecting access 
control models [2]. In common business environment, 
purposes naturally have a hierarchical relationship among 
them, such as generalization and specialization relationships. 
Purposes can be organized according to the hierarchical 
relationships to simplify the management of purposes [6]. In 
this section, we present an overview of the notion of purpose. 
A purpose describes the reasons for data collection and data 
access [2].  The purpose directly dictates how accesses to data 
items should be controlled. A set of purposes P, is organized 
in a tree structure, referred to as a Purpose Tree PT, where 
each node represents a purpose in P and each edge represents 
a hierarchical relation (i.e., specialization and generalization) 
between two purposes. Fig. 1 gives an example of a purpose 
tree. In this example, purpose “Analysis” is a specialization of 
purpose “Admin”.  
To access a specific data item should be allowed if the 
purposes allowed by privacy policies for the data include or 
imply the purpose for accessing the data[2]. Intended purposes 
are purposes associated with data and thus regulate data 
accesses.  Access purposes are purposes for accessing data. 
An intended purpose consists of two components: Allowed 
Intended Purposes (AIP) and Prohibited Intended Purposes 
(PIP). For example, an intended purpose Pu is a tuple (AIP, 
PIP), where AIP ⊆ P and PIP ⊆ P are two sets of purposes.  
Intended purposes can be viewed as brief summaries of 
privacy policies for data. An access decision is made based on 
the relationship between the access purpose and the intended 
purpose of data. When an access is required, the access 
purpose is checked against the intended purposes for the data 
item. That is, access is granted if the access purpose is entailed 
by the AIP and not entailed by the PIP; the access is denied if 
either of these two conditions fails. 
B. Access Purpose Determination 
An access purpose is the reason provided by subjects for 
accessing a data item. The system has to determine the access 
decision that is made directly based on the access purpose. 
The access decision should be dynamically determined, based 
on the current context of the system. For example, suppose an 
employee in the shipping department is requesting to access 
the address of a customer by using a particular application in a 
normal business hour. The key challenge for implementing 
this method is that it may be difficult to infer the access 
purposes accurately and efficiently. As an access purpose has 
a tree structure, it can be used hierarchical documents, such as 
XML documents. In the following section, we present a 
method for determining access purposes in UAC model. 
We extend UAC model by adding access purposes and 
discuss the details of the access purpose authorization and 
verification based on the model.  In our method, users are 
required to state their access purposes along with the data 
access requests, and system validates the stated access 
purposes by ensuring that the users are allowed to access data 
for the purposes. Access purpose authorizations are granted to 
users based on the access purpose on the data, obligations and 
conditions. We have already analysed different authorizations 
models in UAC such as pre-Authorization model and 
ongoing-Authorizations model [7], and will study purpose 
involved  authorization for these models in this paper. 
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 C. Usage Control 
In this section we briefly review the general ideas of usage 
control and its authorization models. The traditional access 
control method normally deals only with authorization 
decisions on users' access to target resources. The usage 
control is a generalization of access control. It enriches and 
refines the access control discipline in its definition and cover 
obligations, conditions, continuity (ongoing controls) and 
mutability [12]. There are eight core components in the usage 
control model: subjects, subject attributes, objects, object 
attributes, rights, authorizations, obligations, and conditions 
(see Fig. 2). The authorization, obligations and conditions are 
components of usage control decisions.   
In the usage control model, the authorization rule permits or 
denies the access of a subject to an object based on subject 
and object attributes. Obligations are performed by subjects or 
by the system. Conditions are not related to subject or object 
attributes. They are system environment restrictions. 
    In the usage control model, subjects and objects are familiar 
concepts with traditional access control. Subject and object 
attributes can be used during the access decision process. 
Subject attributes are identities, group names, roles, 
memberships, security clearance, and so on. Objects are 
entities that subjects hold rights on, whereby the subjects can 
access or use objects. For instance, in an on-line shopping 
store, a customer can be subject. A price could be an object 
attribute,  for example, the soybean machine is priced at $88 
and with delivery is required at $98. Rights are privileges that 
subjects can hold on objects. The authorizations of rights 
require associations with subjects and objects. A right 
represents the access of a subject to an object, such as read or 
write. 
Authorizations, obligations and conditions are decision 
factors used to check and determine whether a subject should 
be allowed to access an object. Obligations and conditions are 
new concepts that can resolve certain shortcomings that have 
been in traditional access controls. In general, the 
authorization of most traditional access controls are assumed 
to be done before access is allowed. However in the usage 
control model it extends this for continuous enforcement. 
Authorizations may require updates on subject and object 
attributes. The process of  continuity properties in usage 
control model consists of three phrases, before usage, ongoing 
usage and after usage. To enforce control decisions, we have 
two different types: pre-decision and ongoing-decision. For 
mutability, there are three kinds of updates: pre-update, 
ongoing-update, and post-update. Therefore, Authorizations 
can be either pre-authorization (preA) or ongoing-
authorization (onA). Pre-authorization is performed before 
authorization is required to the access. But ongoing 
authorization may be performed during the access, such as 
when a book stocking list in a bookstore is periodically 
checked while the access is in progress. 
Obligations are requirements that a subject must perform 
before (pre) or during (ongoing) accesses. An example of a 
pre-obligation is the requirement that a user must provide 
some contact and personal information before accessing IEEE 
digital library. The requirement that a user has to keep certain 
advertising windows open while he is accessing some service, 
is an example of an ongoing obligation. Conditions are 
decision factors that depend on environmental and system-
oriented requirements. Subject and object attributes can be 
used to select which condition requirements have to be used 
for a request. 
Based on the involvement of three decision factors: 
authorizations, obligations, and conditions, we have six 
possible cases as a model for usage control: pre-
Authorizations, ongoing-Authorizations, pre-Obligations, 
ongoing-Obligations, pre-Conditions and ongoing-Conditions. 
III. ACCESS PURPOSE AUTHORIZATION IN THE USAGE 
ACCESS CONTROL MODEL 
A.  Access Purpose Authorization 
An access decision is made based on the relationship 
between the access purpose and the intended purposes of data 
[2].  The access is granted if the access purpose is entailed by 
the allowed intend purposes and not entailed by the prohibited 
intended purposes. In this case we can say the access purpose 
is compliant to the intended purpose. The access is denied if 
any of these two conditions fails; we can say the access 
purpose is not compliant.  
Let PT be a purpose tree and P be the set of all purposes 
in PT. Pu is a set of  intended purposes, denoted as Pu = (AIP, 
PIP) and AP is an access purposes defined over PT. AIP ∈ P, 
PIP ∈ P. AP is compliant to Pu,  denoted as AP ⇒ PT Pu, if 
the following two conditions are satisfied: 
     1. AP ∉  PIP 
     2. AP  ∈ AIP 
where A ⇒  B means B is a necessary condition for A. 
Otherwise,  AP is not compliant to Pu,  denoted as  
AP ≠> PT Pu 
In the usage access control models, access purposes are 
authorized to users through subjects. As above, let PT be a 
purpose tree, Pu be an intended purpose in PT, S be the set of 
subjects in the system. An access purpose is authorized to a 
specific set of users by a 2-tuple (s, pu), where s ∈ S, pu ∈ Pu. 
Note that both the access purpose and subjects may be 
organized in hierarchies. For example,  In Fig. 1, let Pu and 
AP be an intended purpose and an access propose defined 
based on PT.  
Suppose Pu = ({General Purpose}, {Marketing}). If AP = 
Direct-Use, then AP ≠> PT Pu since the hierarchy structure  of  
Direct-Use and Marketing, and  Marketing ∈ PIP. 
However, if AP = Admin, then AP ⇒ PT  Pu, as Admin ∉  PIP 


















































Fig. 2 Components of Usage Control Model 
 
 
B. Access Purpose Authorization with Usage Access Control 
In this section we consider authorization models for access 
purpose adopting usage control. As already discussed, usage 
access control includes components such as subjects, objects 
and obligations. The purpose involved extended usage model 
includes the following components: 
     1. A set of S for subjects, a set of AP as access purposes,  a 
set of O for objects, a set Pu = {AIP, PIP} of purposes, a 
set of R for rights, a set of A for authorizations, a set of B 
for obligations and a set of C for conditions, 
 
     2.  A set of subject with access purpose  
          SP = {(s, ap) | s ∈ S,  ap ∈ AP}, 
          //  Subject s with access purpose ap 
 
     3.  A set of object with intended purpose Pu 
           OP = {(o, pu) | o ∈O,  pu = (aip, pip) ∈  Pu,  
           aip ∈ AIP, pip ∈ PIP}, 
 
     4. Object – subject assignment SOP ⊆ SP × OP is a many-
to-many relation that decides what subjects with which 
access purposes can access the private information 
based on authorization. 
 
We assume that a usage request exists on a purpose target 
object. Decision-making can be done either before (pre) or 
during (ongoing) exercise of the requested right. Decision-
making after the usage has no influence on the decision of 
current usage.  Based on the requirements we have six 
possible cases as a model for usage control: pre-
Authorizations, ongoing-Authorizations, pre-Obligations, 
ongoing-Obligations, pre-Conditions and ongoing-Conditions. 
Depending on the access requirements on the objects in the 
real world, it is possible to utilize more than one case. In this 
paper, we consider only the cases consisting of Authorizations, 
Obligations or Conditions alone with pre or ongoing decisions. 
Meanwhile we focus on developing the usage control models 
for the access purpose documents. 
 
  1). Usage control for pre-Authorization Model (UCMpreA) 
 
In a pre-Authorization usage control model, the decision 
process is performed before access is allowed.  The following 
illustrations of usage decision that can be expressed on the 
objects are made in pre-authorizations. Before pre-
authorization process, we need to decide whether the access 
purpose is compliant or not.  
The UCMpreA model consists of the following components: 
S, O, R, ATT(S), ATT(O), and  usage decision Boolean 
functions preA on O,  respectively, where S, O, R, represent 
Subject, Object and Rights required on the objects.  ATT(S), 
ATT(O),  represent attributes of subjects and objects 
respectively.  preA  is predicates about authorization functions.  
We use the notations of AP, Pu, AIP and PIP as mentioned 
before. SOP is a relation between subject S  and object to O. 
 
     1. S’ ∈ SP,  
         Where SP = {(s, ap) | s ∈ S,  ap  ∈ AP}. 
         In this example SP is a specific set of subjects by a 2-
tuple(s, ap). The access purpose ap could be a subset of 
AP. To simplify the discussion, we assume that ap is a 
single access purpose.   
    
  Rights (R) Objects (O)   Subjects(S) 
(O)
        Subject 
Attributes(ATT(S)) 
Obligations(O) Conditions(C) 
        Object 
Attributes(ATT(O)) 
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      2. O’ ∈ OP,  
         Where OP = {(o, pu) | o ∈ O, pu = (aip, pip) ∈ Pu}, 
In this example OP is a specific set of objects by a 2-tuple 
(o, pu), where o ∈O, pu ∈Pu. That means object O with 
allowed intended purpose aip and prohibited intended 
purpose pip. Both aip and pip can be subsets. 
 
3. Is the access purpose ap compliant to the intended 
purpose  pu?  subject S with access purpose must be 
satisfied ap ⇒ PT pu.  If so, continue; otherwise, the 
access request is denied. 
 
     4. allowed (S’, O’, r) ⇒   preA(ATT(S’), ATT(O’), r), 
In this example this predicate indicates that if subject S’ is 
allowed to access the objects O’ with  right  r, then the 
indicated condition  preA must be true. 
 
5. SOP ⊆ SP × OP. 
           Where SOP is a many-to-many relationship from S to O. 
In our model, we use SOP to specify what subjects with 
which access purpose can access the private information 
objects based on authorization. 
 
The UCMpreA model provides an authorization method on 
whether a subject can access the purpose objects. The 
allowed(s’, o’, r) predicate shows that subject s’ can access 
the object o’.  At this process, the object data is assumed as 
private information which is restricted to access. 
 
  2). Usage control for ongoing Authorizations Model       
(UCMonA) 
 
     A usage control model for ongoing-Authorizations model 
is used to check ongoing authorizations during access 
processes. In this model, usage requests are allowed without 
any ‘pre’ decision making. 
      The UCMonA  model has the following components: S, O, 
R, ATT(S), ATT(O), and SOP as before, and  ongoing usage 
decision functions onA on O. onA is used to check whether S 
can continue to access or not. 
 
     1. S’ ∈ SP,  
         Where SP = {(s, ap) ⎮s ∈ S,  ap  ∈ AP}, 
         This is the same as those in pre-Authorization model. 
 
      2. O’ ∈ OP,  
         Where OP = {(o, pu)⎮ o ∈ O, pu = (aip, pip) ∈ Pu}, 
         This is the same as those in pre-Authorization model. 
 
       3. ap ⇒ PT pu and  allowed (S’, O’, r) ⇒   true, 
         // Access purpose ap of subject s is compliant to the 
intended purpose pu of the object and S’ is accessing O’ 
with permission r.  These are two prerequisites for 
ongoing authorization on object o. 
 
4. stopped (S’, O’, r ) ⇒    ┐onA(ATT(S’), ATT(O’), r),   
The access of subject s to o is terminated if the ongoing 
authorization onA is failed.   
 
   5. SOP ⊆ SP × OP.  
The relationship is the same as those in pre-
Authorization model. 
 
In this model usage decision Boolean functions are onA 
instead of preA. During this process the requested access is 
always allowed as there is no pre-authorization all the time. 
The access purpose ap has to be compliant to the intended 
purpose pu and allowed (s’, o’, r) is required to be true, 
otherwise ongoing authorization should not be initiated. 
Ongoing authorizations are active throughout the usage of the 
requested right, and some requirements are repeatedly 
checked for a continued access. These checks are performed 
periodically based on time or event.  In the process when 
attributes are changed and requirements are no longer 
satisfied, stopped procedures are performed. Stopped (s’, o’, 
r) indicates that right r of subject s’ on object is revoked and 
the ongoing access terminated. For example, a limited number 
of simultaneous usage, suppose only two administration staff 
can access the information about the price of sold books in an 
object o’ simultaneously. If a third administration staff 
requests access and passes the pre-authorization, the staff with 
the earlier time access is terminated. While this is a case of 
ongoing authorizations, it is important that the certificate 
should be evaluated in a pre decision. 
Due to the length of the paper, other authorization models 
are omitted. In practice, the six models pre Authorizations, 
ongoing-Authorizations, pre-Obligations, ongoing-
Obligations, pre-Conditions and ongoing Conditions may 
need to be combined for an access control. We obtain an 
authorization method for the objects by checking users' 
(subjects') authorizations, obligations and conditions with 
continuity properties.  
The objects usually have regular data and sensitive data. 
For the regular data, they do not have intended purpose, but 
for the sensitive data, they may have intended purpose.   The 
following algorithm is based on these models and introduces 
how to manage an document access control when a user 
(subject) applies to access a intended purpose object with right 
r. The output of an access control decision is required to 
satisfy intended purpose object. Since the authorization 
process can remove some parts of the input object, the output 
may not satisfy some particular objects, which are required by 
most applications. In this case, the access will be denied. 
 
Purpose  based Algorithm: 
 
Input:  Subject s needs to access right on object o with access 
purpose (ap), the object o has intended purpose (pu) where pu 
=(aip, pip) 
Output:  Accesses accept or deny 







1) //Verify the compliance between ap and pu 
If ap ∈ aip and ap ∉  pip go to the next step; otherwise the 
access purpose is not compliant and the ACCESS is denied. 
2)endif  
3)//Verify UCMpreA 
4)if preA(ATT(s), ATT(o), r) = false 
//The process in pre-Authorization is not successful 
5)ACCESS denied; 
6)endif; 
7) SOP ⊆ SP × OP  
// subjects with the access purpose can access the private     
   information 
8) ACCESS accepted  
// Verify UCMonA:  
9) if preA(ATT(s), ATT(o), r) = false 
// The process in pre-Authorization is failed, don't need  
   further verification. 
10) Application denied; 
11) endif; 
12) if  ap ≠> PT  pu  
// ap is not compliant to pu any longer 
13) Application denied; 
14) endif; 
15) if onA(ATT(s), ATT(o), r) = false 
16) ACCESS stopped; 
17 )endif  
18)SOP ⊆ SP × OP 
// subjects with the access purpose can continue to access the 
private information 
IV. UAC ARCHITECTURES ON ACCESS PURPOSE 
AUTHORIZATION 
In this section, we discuss a structure of UAC architectures 
based on access purpose authorization. Following Fig. 3 
shows the implementation layout based on our proposed 
architecture presented in Section 3. An access control 
framework consists of Usage Decision Facility (UDF) and 
Usage Enforcement Facility (UEF). Each facility includes 
several functional modules.  UDF includes authorization, 
condition and obligation decision modules. When a subject 
sends an access request through UDF to the Authorization 
module, the Authorization module verifies the authorization 
process and checks whether the request is allowed or not.  
The condition module is used to make a decision for 
whether the conditional requirements are satisfied or not. The 
Obligation module is applied to verify whether obligations 
have been performed or not before or during the requested 
usage.  The entire messages transported among the services 
are identified in purpose data.  
In order to build a usage access control with the notion 
purpose, we must consider the subjects and objects in this 
model with access purposes. The system has to make decision 
by using access purpose (AP). In this model, an access 
decision for the subjects and objects is made based on the 
compliance between the access purpose ap and the intended 
purpose (aip, pip) of the object. 
There are purpose subjects and purpose objects.  Subjects 
access the objects based on usage access control.  When an 
access is required, the access purpose is checked against the 
intended purposes for the data item by using the comparisons 
of the access purpose to the allowed intended purpose and the 
prohibited intended purpose. The relationship between 
subjects and objects belongs to SOP. In our model, we use 
SOP to specify what subjects with which access purposes can 



















Fig. 3 UAC Architectures on Access Purpose Authorization 
V. RELATED WORK 
Our work is related to many areas of privacy preserving 
access control, specially private data management system. We 
also exploit the tremendous work carried  out for usage access 
control which mainly focuses on secure management of data. 
Recently, Byun, Bertion and Li [2] introduced a purpose-
based access control suited for hierarchical data. Their work 
focuses on how to determine the purpose for which certain 
data are accessed by a given user.  Their proposed solution 
relies on the well-known role based access control (RBAC) 
model as well as the notion of conditional role which is based 
on the notions of role attribute and system attribute. It 
supports data access control based on the purpose information. 
However, our work substantially differs from that proposal.  
The main differences in our approach are in the following 
aspects. Firstly, their protocol is based on RBAC and hence it 
focuses on permissions-role assignment, objects hierarchies 
and constrains. Our approach is based on usage control, we 
have analysed the characteristics of various access 
authorizations and presented detailed models for different 
kinds of authorizations. Secondly, their approach does not 
mention how to update users' permissions on the objects when 
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 important state for the data in the Internet since users always 
alter their conditions or obligations.   By contrast, users in our 
scheme have to pass pre-Authorizations and ongoing-
Authorizations as well as pre-Obligations, pre-Conditions and 
ongoing-Obligations and ongoing-Conditions.  This indicates 
that our method is much more powerful in dynamic 
environments.  
Previous work we used to focus on using usage access 
control methods with XML document [13]. In the 
authorization models, the subjects and objects for access 
control are elements of XML documents. We did not provide 
the access control models based on the purpose information. 
Also, Elisa and Elena [3] presented an access control system 
supporting selective distribution of XML documents among 
possible large user communities by using a range of key 
distribution methods.  In their papers, a formal model of 
access control policies for XML documents is given. It 
focuses on key distribution methods to protect XML 
documents. The approach consists of encrypting different 
portions of the same document according to different 
encryption keys, and selectively distributing these keys to the 
various users. By contrast, in this paper our work included an 
extended usage access control model and supports purpose 
hierarchy and granularity of data by using access purposes, 
purpose associated data models. We provided a rich variety of 
options that can deal with purpose data. Users can access 
purpose information with their keys at any time, even when 
their properties are updated. In our scheme, users have to 
satisfy pre-Authorizations, pre-Obligations and pre-
Conditions as well as ongoing-Authorizations, ongoing-
Obligations, ongoing-Conditions. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we presented a purpose-based access control 
suited for hierarchical data. We also proposed an efficient 
method for determining access purposes, which uses the 
notion purpose of subjects and objects by using usage control. 
Usage control models provide an approach for the next 
generation of access control.  In usage control we analyse not 
only   decision factors, such as authorizations, obligations and 
conditions, but also the continuity properties (Ongoing 
authorization).  This paper also illustrates two different kinds 
of models built for purpose data. The methods presented in 
this paper can be used to control purpose data in a dynamic 
environment.  It also begins a new application with usage 
control.  This paper represents only a first step for 
authorization model in purpose data with usage control. Much 
work is still to be done before these models can be used in 
practice. 
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